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CURRENT LEGISLATION
BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
Congress recently enacted two amendments to the Bankruptcy Act'
which will affect the court's power and control of the bankrupt's assets. The
first of these amendments changes section 47(a) (2) of the Act. 2 Previously,
this section had merely provided that one duty of the trustee in bankruptcy
was to "deposit all money received . . . in designated depositories." The
amendment to this section now permits the trustee, with the approval of the
court, to deposit assets of the bankrupt in interest-bearing accounts after
initially placing them in demand deposits.° The second amendment changes
section 60(d) of the Act,' giving the court, on its own motion, the power to
examine the reasonableness of any remuneration given in contemplation of
filing a petition by the debtor to his attorney for services rendered or to be
rendered .° In addition, this section now allows the court to examine, on its
own motion or on that of the bankrupt, any agreement made by the bankrupt
before or after filing to transfer money or property to an attorney after
filing.° Previously, the court's examination of transfers in contemplation of
bankruptcy was begun only upon petition of the trustee or a creditor, and
there was no specific provision in this section for examination of agreements
for post-filing transfers.?
While the original enactment of section 47 did not specifically prohibit
the deposit of funds in interest-bearing accounts, two early cases restricted
the trustee to use of demand deposits. In Huttig Mfg. Co. v. Edwards' and
1 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1958).
2 52 Stat. 860 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
	 75(a)(2) (1958).
3 77 Stat. 14 (1963), 11 U.S.C.A.
	
75(a)(2) (Supp. 1963). The amendment in
full reads: "(2) deposit all money received by them in designated depositories initially
in demand deposits; and subsequently, if authorized by the court, in interest -bearing
savings deposits, time certificates of deposit, or time deposits-open account." [Emphasis
supplied.]
' 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 . U.S.C. § 96(d) (1958).
5 77 Stat. 14 (1963), 11 U.S.C.A. 	 96(d) (Supp. 1963) provides that:
If a debtor shall; directly or indirectly, in contemplation of the filing of a peti-
tion by or against him, pay money or transfer property to an attorney at law,
for services [rendered or] to be rendered, the transaction [may be examined
by the court on its motion or] shall be examined by the court on petition of the
trustee or any creditor and shall be held valid only to the extent of a reason-
able amount to be determined by the court, and the excess may be recovered
by the trustee for the benefit of the estate.
[If, whether before or after filing, a debtor shall agree orally or in writing
to pay money or transfer property to an attorney at law after the filing, the
transaction may be examined by the court on its own motion or shall be ex-
amined by the court on petition of the bankrupt made prior to discharge and
shall be held valid only to the extent of a reasonable amount to be determined
by the court, and any excess obligation shall be canceled, or if excess payment
or transfer has been made, returned to the bankrupt.] (Changes added by
amendment are in brackets.)
° Supra note 5.
Supra note 4.
8 160 Fed. 619 (8th Cir. 1908).
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In Re Dayton Coal & Iron Co.,° the courts held that the duty of the trustee
was to protect the assets for the creditors and that "the risk which always
attends the making of profit should not be incurred. . . ." 10 These decisions
reduced both the court's power to designate a depository and restricted the
trustee to one type of deposit. In the sweeping amendments made to the Act
in 1938, Congress did give the trustee slightly more leeway by allowing him
to deposit funds in more than one of the designated depositories." That en-
actment allowed the trustee to distribute the assets of a large estate among
a number of banks. However, the deposits still were required to have instant-
liquidity, which dictated the use of checking accounts by the trustee.
Though Huttig and In re Dayton recognized that interest-bearing ac-
counts were possible if all parties concerned consented, 12 use of this device was
unwieldy and time-consuming. As the Senate Judiciary Committee stated, "In
a few instances in recent years bankruptcy courts have authorized trustees
to deposit estate funds in interest-bearing accounts with the consent of credi-
tors. This procedure, however, is very cumbersome and there would seem to
be no reason why the deposits should not be permitted with proper security
when authorized by the court."'s The present amendment brought these hopes
to fruition. The Act has always provided security for the deposits through
section 61. 14 Realizing this fact and the fact that "sound fiscal management
requires that funds of the bankrupt's estate shall not lie idle for long periods
of time but should earn interest . . . ," 15 the new amendment was passed on
its second appearance in Congress. 1 ° It should be noted that under the
amendment the court still must designate the depositories??
It is evident from this change in the Act that Congress felt that while
the Act's main purpose is to protect creditors, this does not always have to be
done in the most stringent manner. Demand deposits give liquidity at the
loss of potential income. Now the trustee of a large estate, which may re-
quire months or even years to close, will be able to decrease idle assets for
the benefit of the creditors. While the courts will probably require the trustee
to keep a percentage of the funds he controls in demand deposits, there is now
no barrier to the placing of deposits in earning accounts in one or more de-
positories.
The amendment to section 60(d) was also designed to remedy problems
of administration. Before the amendment, the review by the court of fees
paid by the debtor to an attorney in contemplation of bankruptcy was a
cumbersome process which was infrequently invoked except in the most
flagrant cases. This resulted from the following factors: the trustees handling
9 239 Fed. 737 (ED. Tenn. 1916).
10 Supra note 8, at 623.
11 Supra note 2. Prior to 1938 the trustee was limited to the use of one depository.
12 Supra note 8, at 623, and supra note 9, at 738.
la U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 675, 676 (June 5, 1963).
14 66 Stat. 425 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 101 (1958). This section requires the depositories
to post either a bond with surety or securities in sufficient amount to cover deposit.
No security is required if the deposits are insured by the FDIC.
16 1 Bankr. L. Rep. ¶ 5072 (May 16, 1963).
16 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 674 (June 5, 1963).
17 Supra note 3.
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the estate in bankruptcy are often loathe to accuse a fellow attorney of
overcharging; his brother lawyers are reluctant to testify against him, and
creditors are often ignorant of the facts. 18
 For these reasons, Congress con-
cluded that "experience has shown that this language [of section 60(d)] is
inadequate to protect both the creditors and the bankrupt from excessive
attorneys' fees. In bankruptcy, the motivations which normally prevent over-
charge are often absent." 4° The new amendment to section 60(d) of this Act
gives the court discretion on its own motion to examine the reasonableness of
these fees. 2° The amendment also gives the court power to review agreements
made before filing between the debtor and his attorney regarding post-filing
fees.24
 These powers, together with those already present in section 62(a)
(1),22
 give the court total control over fees paid by the debtor to an attorney,
without having to wait for a petition from one of the parties.
The standard of review of these fees has already been established by
section 60(d), which employs a test of reasonableness. What constitutes
"reasonableness" in this context was best enunciated in the case of In re
Charles Ray Glass, Inc., the court saying: "It [time spent] is only one of
the elements which enter into the determination of reasonableness. The other
elements are the nature of the work, the necessity for spending the time
claimed, the amount and character of the assets and liabilities, and the like." 28
While the aforementioned elements are not the only tests, they are likely to be
part of any other test devised. In one case the District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that the State Bar Association Code of Ethics
test of reasonableness could be used. 24 The attorney receiving a fee from a
debtor who is contemplating bankruptcy must remember that this test of
reasonableness is applied not only for fees received for services "germane to
the aims of the Bankruptcy Act," 22 but also for any services as long as "the
payment or transfer was in contemplation of bankruptcy."20 Despite the
factors to be considered, such as those set out in the Glass case, the courts
do recognize that the value of an attorney's services cannot be measured with
mathematical certainty and that the court's discretion is fairly wide. 27 This
service must be of a legal nature, however, for the courts will not consider
work which an auditor or a clerk could have done as part of a legal fee. 28
The examinations under section 60(d) are carried out by summary
process by the court "in the exercise of its general authority over the pro-
18 Supra note 16, at 678.
19 Ibid.
29 Supra note 5.
21 Ibid.
22 52 Stat. 872 (1946), II U.S.C. § 102(a) (1) (1958). This section gives the court
control of fees for post-filing services.
23 47 F. Supp. 428, 430 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
24 In the matter of Knickerbocker Leather & Novelty Co., 158 F. Supp. 236, 238
(SD. N.Y. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Harr v. Oseland, 265 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1959).
25 Conrad V. Pender, 289 U.S. 472, 478 (1933).
26 Id. at 477.
27 In re Hamburger, 103 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1939).
28 Supra note 23, at 430.
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fessional conduct of its attorneys, as officers of the court. . . ." 23 The Supreme
Court has determined that this summary process does not violate the Seventh
Amendment of the Constitution requiring jury trials S 0 Once the fee has
been found unreasonable under section 60(d), the excess is recoverable from
the attorney by the trustee or the bankrupt, as the case may be, by contempt
proceedings rather than by a judgments'
How much effect these two amendments will have will be demonstrated
only after they have been given time to operate. It seems likely, however, that
both the courts and the trustee will take advantage of the added powers given
to them. This will permit creditors to receive increased assets and will require
greater diligence by the debtor's attorney, who will feel the weight of an in-
creased scrutiny of his fee.
E. CARL UEHLEIN, JR.
BLUE SKY LEGISLATION
UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT
There has been extensive legislation in the area of state security regu-
lation, including many significant amendments to existing laws and the
adoption or substantial adoption of the Uniform Securities Act" by Nevada 2
and Utah. 3 Codifying it in its entirety, Utah became the sixteenth state to
adopt Professor Loss's Uniform Act. 4 The substitution by Utah of the
Uniform Securities Act for its previous blue sky law continues a definite
trend toward uniformity in this field of state regulation .°
Nevada, which previously did not have a blue sky law, has now enacted
such legislation, adopting certain sections of the Uniform Act .° This leaves
Delaware as the only state with no legislation in this area of the law.7
Nevada, rather than adopting the three methods of registration of se-
curities prescribed by the Uniform Act,' selected only one method.° The
29 In re Debbins, 53 F.2d 1018, 1020 (E.D. Mich. 1931).
30 In re Wood and Henderson, 210 U.S. 246, 258 (1908).
3t In the matter of A. & V. Appliance Co., 149 F. Supp. 3, 4 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
1 For an analysis of the Uniform Securities Act, its background and the extent
of its adoption see Legislation, 3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 455 (1962); Blue Sky L.
Rep. 4901-4953.
2 Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 7.2-.22 (Supp. 1963).
a Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1-61-1-30 (1953).
4 For a list of states accepting all or portions of the Uniform Securities Act see
Blue Sky L. Rep. ¶ 4901.
5 Supra note 3. For a brief analysis of the four basic parts of the Uniform
Securities Act see Legislation, 3 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 218 n.2 (1961).
41 Supra note 2.
7 Blue Sky L. Rep. ¶ 11,101.
8 The Uniform Securities Act provides for registration by notification, § 302;
coordination, 303; qualification, 304. For an explanation of these three types, see
Legislation, 3 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 461-64 (1962).
9 Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 7.15-.16 (Supp. 1963).
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